Continuing a trial date, and the deadlines that do not move with it

Most continuance problems are not about whether the court will grant it. They are about what the parties assumed the new date carried with it. The rule that governs the request is short and the statutes that ignore the new date are scattered across three separate chapters of the Code.

The rule itself is older than most of the practice around it. Rule 3.1332 was amended and renumbered effective 1 January 2007 and was adopted as rule 375 effective 1 January 1984, with amendments in 1985, 1995 and 2004. Nothing in the 2025 or 2026 rule packages changed it.

How you ask, and why a stipulation is not enough

Rule 3.1332(b) reaches stipulated continuances by name. An agreement among counsel moves nothing until the court acts on it.

Two things follow from that sentence and both get missed. The first is that a signed stipulation sitting in the file is not a continuance, so the case is still on calendar and everyone is still expected to appear ready. The second is that the rule wants declarations, not argument: the showing has to be evidentiary, from someone with knowledge of the circumstance relied on.

A noticed motion runs on the ordinary clock at CCP 1005(b): served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing, extended by service method under CCP 1010.6 or CCP 1013, opposition at nine court days, reply at five. That is often longer than the time left before trial, which is why these are so frequently brought ex parte.

The seven circumstances and the eleven factors

Rule 3.1332(c) says what may be good cause. Rule 3.1332(d) says what the court weighs after it finds some. Both lists are open ended.

Rule 3.1332(c) lists seven circumstances that may indicate good cause: the unavailability of an essential lay or expert witness through death, illness or other excusable circumstances, at (c)(1); the same as to a party, at (c)(2); the same as to trial counsel, at (c)(3); the substitution of trial counsel, but only where required in the interests of justice, at (c)(4); the addition of a new party where either the new party or the existing parties have not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery and preparation, at (c)(5); a party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents or other material evidence despite diligent efforts, at (c)(6); and a significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case such that it is not ready for trial, at (c)(7).

Rule 3.1332(d) then lists eleven factors, running from the proximity of the trial date at (d)(1) through any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion at (d)(11). Three of them decide most contested applications: whether there was any previous continuance at (d)(2), the availability of alternative means to address the problem at (d)(4), and the prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer at (d)(5). Rule 3.1332(d)(4) is the one to answer in the declaration before the opposition raises it.

What does not move with the trial date

Two chapters of the Discovery Act are written against the date "initially set," and a continuance does not touch either.

CCP 2024.020(a) entitles a party as a matter of right to complete discovery on or before the 30th day, and to have discovery motions heard on or before the 15th day, "before the date initially set for the trial of the action." Those are calendar days counted backward from a trial date rather than forward from service of anything, so no extension under CCP 1010.6 or CCP 1013 reaches them.

That is CCP 2024.020(b) in full, and it is the single most useful sentence on this page. The two routes out of it are a motion under CCP 2024.050, which has to be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under CCP 2016.040 and which the court decides on four enumerated factors at CCP 2024.050(b), and a written agreement under CCP 2024.060, which may be informal but has to be confirmed in a writing specifying the extended date. Section 2024.060 says in terms that such an agreement does not require the court to continue the trial.

Expert discovery is keyed the same way. CCP 2034.220 requires the demand to be made no later than the 10th day after the initial trial date has been set, or 70 days before that trial date, whichever is closer to the trial date. CCP 2034.230(b) sets the exchange at 50 days before the initial trial date, or 20 days after service of the demand, whichever is closer to the trial date, unless the court on motion and a showing of good cause orders an earlier or later date. The 50-day leg runs backward from a trial date and picks up no service extension. The 20-day leg runs from service of the demand, which is where CCP 1010.6 and CCP 1013 operate.

The statutory text contains no provision resetting either date when the trial is continued, and no published decision was located holding that a continuance moves them. The only mechanism the sections name for moving the exchange is a motion on good cause under section 2034.230(b).

The five-year clock does not stop

A continued trial date past the five-year mark is not an extension of the five-year period, and the statute says the requirement is mandatory.

CCP 583.310 has no subdivisions and one sentence: "An action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant." The period is calendar time from commencement against that defendant. It is not triggered by service, so no service extension touches it.

The parties can extend it, but only two ways. CCP 583.330(a) allows a written stipulation, which need not be filed but has to be brought to the court's attention if relevant to a dismissal motion. CCP 583.330(b) allows an oral agreement made in open court, if entered in the minutes or a transcript is made. Separately, CCP 583.340 excludes time during which the court's jurisdiction to try the action was suspended, at (a); prosecution or trial was stayed or enjoined, at (b); or bringing the action to trial was impossible, impracticable or futile, at (c).

CCP 583.360(b) closes the door: "The requirements of this article are mandatory and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute."

Running the other way, Munoz v. City of Tracy (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 354, 359, 361, held that a written stipulation continuing trial to a specific date beyond the five-year period extends the period under section 583.330 without any express reference to the statute, because section 583.330 imposes no particular formality. So the fix is cheap: put the new date in a signed written stipulation rather than a minute order, and the date itself does the work.

Summary judgment, and the one date that does move

Section 437c(a)(3) is keyed to "the date of trial," not to the initial trial date, which is the opposite of the Discovery Act's choice.

After AB 2049 the deadlines are longer than most forms show. CCP 437c(a)(2) requires notice and supporting papers served at least 81 days before the hearing. The same subdivision adds 5, 10 or 20 days for mail service, depending on where the address is, and two court days for fax, express mail or overnight delivery; the summary judgment timing guide covers electronic service and the rest of the chain. CCP 437c(b)(2) sets opposition at not less than 20 days before the noticed or continued hearing date, and CCP 437c(b)(4) sets reply at not less than 11 days. CCP 437c(a)(3) requires the motion to be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.

Read the two phrasings next to each other. CCP 2024.020(a) says "the date initially set for the trial." CCP 2034.220 says "the initial trial date." CCP 437c(a)(3) says "the date of trial." The Legislature used the qualifier where it meant the first date and left it out here. No published decision construing that contrast was located, so this page states it as a difference in the text rather than as a holding.

Preference cases, where the court's discretion is capped

Section 36(f) is the rare place the Code tells the court how long a continuance may be.

That is CCP 36(f). Rule 3.1332(d)(6) separately directs the court, where the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, to weigh the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay. The two work together: the rule tells the court to take preference seriously, and the statute tells it how far it may go anyway.

CCP 36(g) is the exception that runs the other direction. On a granted subdivision (b) motion in an action based on a health provider's alleged professional negligence as defined in CCP 364, the trial date is not sooner than six months and not later than nine months from the date the motion is granted, which displaces the 120 days for that category.

The local layer

Everything above is statewide. Trial continuance practice is one of the places the department matters more than the county, because the department that set the trial date decides whether it moves.

San Diego. The department's own standing order and its trial readiness conference practice set what has to be lodged and when.

Riverside and San Bernardino. No published local rule was located in either county changing what rule 3.1332 requires.

Everywhere else, the statewide rule is the rule. This site does not guess at how a department it does not appear in handles a trial continuance, and stops here.